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AS JUDGES, LEGISLATORS, AND LEGAL SCHOLARS increasingly grapple with the 
Internet’s impact on defamation law,1 comparative legal scholarship has uncovered 
long-standing problems with its most fundamental of responsibilities.2 Namely, 
efforts to balance political criticism and personal character in public libel cases 
have been beset by widespread misuse of democratic free speech justifications.3 
To be precise, courts and legislatures have defended their doctrinal approaches 
1. See e.g. Law Commission of Ontario, “Defamation Law in the Internet Age: Consultation 
Paper” (Toronto: LCO, November 2017); Law Commission of Ontario, “Defamation Law 
and the Internet: Where Do We Go From Here?” (Panel delivered at the Donald Lamont 
Learning Centre, Law Society of Ontario, 3 May 2018) [unpublished]. Britain’s recent 
reforms did not extend to the Internet. See e.g. UK, HC, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices 
and Ethics of the Press (Cm 779), by the Right Honourable Lord Justice Leveson (London: 
The Stationary Office, November 2012); Defamation Act 2013 (UK).
2. See Randall Stephenson, A Crisis of Democratic Accountability: Public Libel Law and the 
Checking Function of the Press (Oxford: Hart, 2018).
3. Ibid. “Public libel” refers to the use of defamation law in cases involving defamatory 
statements of fact on matters of public interest published to a mass audience, where the 
plaintiff is a politician, public official, or influential public figure or corporation (ibid at 1).
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by appealing to democratic theory in the abstract, too often emphasizing its least 
relevant features and overlooking the accountability concerns most applicable to 
adjudicating public libel cases. Affecting the various political speech and public 
interest defences endorsed since the US Supreme Court’s seminal judgment in 
New York Times v Sullivan,4 this undertheorizing has compromised public libel 
doctrine worldwide, resulting in arbitrary over- and under-protection of political 
speech and expression.5
This article has three principal objectives: (1) to diagnose the causes of these 
theoretical inaccuracies; (2) to describe their deleterious effects on public libel 
doctrine; and (3) to state the significance of this impact for modern defamation 
law reform. Part I begins by exploring eighteenth-century libertarian thought for 
indications of the press’s quasi-constitutional role in holding power to account. 
Besides establishing precursors to contemporary notions of freedom of the press 
and watchdog journalism, this enquiry confirms the press’s critical function 
as a horizontal accountability mechanism.6 Unlike other extra-governmental 
methods, the press supplies full-spectrum accountability, capable in principle 
of checking all libel plaintiffs and branches of government within any form of 
representative democracy.
Part II proceeds by distinguishing the two democratic models at the 
core of our enquiry: Alexander Meiklejohn’s “self-governance” rationale and 
Vincent Blasi’s “checking value” of the press.7 As we shall see, each highlights 
different aspects of democratic theory and supports a distinct conception of the 
press, yet the two models are all too often conflated. As a result, public libel 
doctrine continues to reflect an improper balancing of freedom of expression 
4. 376 US 254 (1964) [Sullivan]. See also Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd, [1994] 
HCA 46 [Theophanous]; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp, [1997] HCA 25; Reynolds v 
Times Newspapers Ltd, [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) [Reynolds]; Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe, 
[2006] UKHL 44; Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd, [2012] UKSC 11; Lange v Atkinson, [1998] 
3 NZLR 424 (CA) [Lange, 1998]; Lange v Atkinson, [2000] 1 NZLR 257 (PC); Lange v 
Atkinson, [2000] 3 NZLR 385 (CA); Grant v Torstar Corp, 2009 SCC 61 [Grant].
5. Stephenson, supra note 2, ch 1.
6. See e.g. Pippa Norris, “Watchdog Journalism” in Mark Bovens, Robert E Goodin & Thomas 
Schillemans, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014) 525; Pippa Norris, ed, Public Sentinel: News Media & Governance Reform 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010).
7. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1965) [Meiklejohn, Political Freedom]; Alexander Meiklejohn, 
“The First Amendment is an Absolute” (1961) 1 Sup Ct Rev 245 [Meiklejohn, “The First 
Amendment”]; Vincent Blasi, “The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory” (1977) 2 
American Bar Foundation Research J 521 [Blasi, “Checking”].
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and reputation, overly discounting the former. Part II then examines two 
underlying causes of public libel law’s undertheorizing, arguing that difficulties 
marshalling democratic theory are due primarily to incomplete articulations of 
free expression’s core justifications and misguided attempts to subsume these 
rationales under single-valued approaches. Both have excessively marginalized 
the checking function of the press, the free expression justification most relevant 
to adjudicating public libel cases.
Part III commences by describing the deleterious effects of this undertheorizing 
on public libel doctrine. This problem of public libel law shows that, even in 
cases fundamental to democratic governance where our defamation laws must 
carefully balance political criticism against personal character and reputation, 
we have unwittingly adopted less press-friendly doctrine than required. That is, 
by disregarding accountability concerns and the checking function rationale, 
efforts to rebalance free expression against reputation have never reflected the 
most relevant or fully articulated aspects of democratic theory. Sound public libel 
doctrine, along with defamation law more generally, ultimately depends upon 
fully theorized free expression justifications applied to relevant disputes.
Part III concludes our enquiry by identifying five implications of this 
undertheorizing for defamation reform in the wake of the Internet, namely, the 
need to: (1) avoid one-size-fits-all answers; (2) embrace comparative law analysis; 
(3) reinstate accountability in democratic free expression theory; (4) insist upon a 
tightly argued theory—doctrine interface; and (5) recognize the etiology of legal 
problems in broader socio-political contexts. Above all, special attention must be 
paid to proposed reforms affecting government, politicians, or influential public 
figures and corporations. These are the plaintiffs whose use of defamation law 
poses the greatest threat to democratic legitimacy, and with whom the checking 
function’s role in promoting more press-friendly doctrine becomes crucial for 
holding to account our political representatives and those exercising significant 
power and influence in society.
I. BRITISH PARLIAMENTARISM AND THE “FOURTH 
ESTATE”
Before reviewing Meiklejohn and Blasi’s models, it is instructive to situate the 
checking function in eighteenth-century libertarian thought.8 This examination 
8. The term “libertarian” refers to Britain’s Radical Whigs, political commentators associated 
with the British Whig faction, who were at the forefront of the radical movement in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Despite finding fame and favour only later with 
American revolutionaries, these commentators provided impressive analyses of democratic 
accountability and the checking function of the press.
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reveals that: (1) Radical Whig and Commonwealthmen publications contained 
lucid formulations of the press as a horizontal accountability mechanism; and (2) 
by developing substantially similar conceptions of the press’s checking function, 
theorists on both sides of the Atlantic established the foundational importance of 
accountability to democratic theory and governance.
A. PARLIAMENTARISM AND RADICAL WHIG THEORY
Britain’s Radical Whigs were first to craft systematic defences of press liberty 
and to defend citizens’ rights to criticize government. Developing “from 
the bowels of the print culture itself ” throughout the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries,9 Radical Whigs not only gave the phrase “freedom of the 
press” an established meaning, but also provided many of the earliest and most 
articulate formulations of the checking function rationale.10 While Parliament’s 
control of political criticism extended to prosecutions for breach of privilege by 
the House of Commons and (less regularly) the House of Lords,11 England’s 
principal response to such criticism involved a powerful antecedent to public 
libel: Criminal prosecutions for seditious libel.
1. CRIMINALIZING pOLITICAL DISSENT
The law of seditious libel was most authoritatively pronounced in the Tuchin 
case.12 As Lord Chief Justice John Holt explained at the dawn of Britain’s newly 
9. Patrick J Charles & Kevin Francis O’Neill, “Saving the Press Clause from Ruin: The 
Customary Origins of a ‘Free Press’ as Interface to the Present and Future” 2012 Utah L Rev 
1691 at 1703. See also Melinda S Zook, Radical Whigs and Conspiratorial Politics in Late 
Stuart England (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999); Leonard 
W Levy, ed, Freedom of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson: Early American Libertarian Theories 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966); David A Anderson, “The Origins of the Press Clause” 
(1983) 30 UCLA L Rev 455; Fredrick Seaton Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 
1476–1776: The Rise and Decline of Government Control (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1952) ch 14, 18.
10. Ibid at 64. See also John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton, for the Liberty of 
vnlicenc’d Printing, to the Parlament of England (London: Publisher Unknown, 1644).
11. Siebert, supra note 9 at 368-74.
12. (1704) 90 ER 1133 [Tuchin]. While a tiny portion of Britain’s adult population could vote at 
this time, this only supported the Radical Whigs’ resolve to safeguard political accountability 
through extra-governmental institutions. This insight is supported by public accountability 
scholarship, which confirms that general elections are among the weakest and least reliable 
accountability mechanisms, aligning voter preferences with government policy only over 
many years or decades. See e.g. Mark E Warren, “Accountability and Democracy” in Mark 
Bovens, Robert E Goodin & Thomas Schillemans, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Public 
Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 39 at 45. See also Bernard Manin, 
Adam Przeworski & Susan C Stokes, “Elections and Representation” in Adam Przeworski, 
Susan C Stokes & Bernard Manin, eds, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation 
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emerging parliamentary democracy, this offence left little room for criticizing 
government entities:
If men should not be called to account for possessing the people with an ill opinion 
of the Government, no Government can subsist; for it is very necessary for every 
Government, that the people should have a good opinion of it. And nothing can 
be worse to any Government, than to endeavour to procure animosities as to the 
management of it. This has been always look’d upon as a crime, and no Government 
can be safe unless it is punished.13
After England’s statutory licensing system “died on grounds of expediency” 
in the late seventeenth century,14 Radical Whigs redefined such anti-democratic 
views in response to rising seditious libel prosecutions. Following earlier 
treatises by Charles Blount (under pseudonym “Philopatris”) and John 
Toland,15 Matthew Tindal characterized the checking function of the press as an 
extra-governmental check on political power, arguing that “[t]he liberty of the 
Press must keep a Ministry within some tolerable Bounds, by exposing their ill 
Designs to the People.”16 Besides endorsing the press’s checking function, Tindal 
astutely forecasted the perils of government public relations and unrestrained 
executive power.
Arguably, “[n]o libertarian theorist … progressed beyond the 
no-prior-restraints concept of freedom of the press until ‘Cato’ burst upon 
the scene.”17 Cato’s Letters was published in London newspapers by Whig 
political journalists John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon.18 Though debatable 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 29 at 50.
13. Tuchin, supra note 12 at 1133-34.
14. Levy, supra note 9 at xxii. See also Siebert, supra note 9 at 260-63; J L De Lolme, The 
Constitution of England; In Which it is Compared Both with the Republican Form of 
Government, and the Other Monarchies in Europe (London: Publisher Unknown, 1822) at 
172-73; Licensing of the Press Act, 1662 (UK), 14 Car II, c 33.
15. See Philopatris [Charles Blunt], A Just Vindication of Learning: or, An Humble Address to the 
High Court of Parliament In behalf of the Liberty of the Press (London: Publisher Unknown, 
1679); John Toland, A Letter to a Member of Parliament, Shewing, that a Restraint On the 
Press Is inconsistent with the Protestant Religion, and dangerous to the Liberties of the Nation 
(London: Publisher Unknown, 1698).
16. Matthew Tindal, Reasons Against Restraining the Press (London: Publisher Unknown, 1704) at 
13. See also John Asgill, An Essay for the Press (London: Publisher Unknown, 1712); Joseph 
Addison, The Thoughts of a Tory Author, Concerning the Press: With the Opinion of the Ancients 
and Moderns, about Freedom of Speech and Writing (London: Publisher Unknown, 1712).
17. Levy, supra note 9 at xxiii.
18. John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letters: Or, Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, 
And other important Subjects, vol 1-4 (London: Publisher Unknown, 1723-24).
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whether Cato’s Letters owed much to Tindal and earlier Radical Whigs19 when 
contrasted with the submissive citizenry sanctioned in the Tuchin case, a bold 
theory of political accountability was developed in their four essays published 
from 1720 to 1722.
In “Of Freedom of Speech: That the same is inseparable from Publick Liberty,” 
the authors proposed an unflinching model of free expression, challenging Lord 
Chief Justice Holt’s prior pronouncements:
That Men ought to speak well of the Governours, is true, while their Governours 
deserve to be well spoken of; but to do publick Mischief, without hearing of it, is 
only the Prerogative and Felicity of Tyranny: A free People will be shewing that they 
are so, by their Freedom of Speech.20
Trenchard and Gordon also conceived magisterial duties as consonant with 
fiduciary obligations, representative government being “nothing else but the 
Attendance of the Trustees of the People upon the Interest and Affairs of the 
People.”21 For this reason, “it is the Part and Business of the People … to see 
whether they be well or ill transacted.”22 Associating press coverage with improved 
disclosure of political misconduct, they reasoned:
Misrepresentation of publick Measures is easily overthrown, by representing publick 
Measures truly; when they are honest, they ought to be publickly known, that they 
may be publickly commended; but if they are knavish or pernicious, they ought to 
be publickly exposed, in order to be publickly detested.23
Likewise, in “Reflections upon Libelling,”24 the authors endorsed 
strengthened seditious libel defences. Liberating justification from its restriction 
“to private and personal Failings,” only,25 Cato reasoned that “[t]he exposing 
… of publick Wickedness, as it is a Duty which every Man owes to Truth and 
his Country, can never be a Libel.”26 In “Discourse upon Libels,”27 Trenchard 
and Gordon again implicated the corrective effect of newspapers, insisting that 
19. Charles & O’Neill, supra note 9 at 1712.
20. Trenchard & Gordon, supra note 18, vol 1 at 98.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid at 101-02.
24. Ibid at 252-61.
25. Ibid at 253.
26. Ibid.
27. Trenchard & Gordon, supra note 18, vol 3 at 292-99.
(2018) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL24
“[w]hat are usually call’d Libels, undoubtedly keep great Men in Awe, and are 
some Check upon their Behaviour.”28
In the end, it is hard to disagree that “Cato’s Letters was the high-water 
mark of libertarian theory until the close of the eighteenth century.”29 While 
not attacking seditious libels entirely (i.e., false libellous statements remained 
unopposed),30 Cato nonetheless claimed that: (1) government is grounded in 
fiduciary obligations owed by political representatives to the citizenry; (2) 
a primary obligation of citizens is to monitor and expose public misconduct; 
(3) freedom of speech and the press are inextricably linked to these monitoring 
activities; and (4) justification should constitute a complete defence to seditious 
libel. In fact, so comprehensive were these prescriptions for political liberty that 
very nearly only the press required further elaboration.
2. THE CORRECTIVE EFFECT OF THE pRESS
Another surge of libertarian thought began later in the eighteenth century, 
accompanied by increasing demand for press liberty. Legal historians confirm 
that following Cato’s Letters, the phrase “freedom of the press” was referenced “in 
the courts as early as 1732 and in the House of Commons in 1738.”31
For instance, Father of Candor, a prominent Whig supporter and pamphleteer, 
reasoned that, since public officials’ posts “are not like any individual’s particular 
trade, profession or fortune, … [t]heir holding ought only to be quam diu bene 
se gesserint [during good behaviour], and of this the people at large ought to be 
made judges.”32 Indeed, when witnessing political misconduct, he observed it 
was “natural for [citizens] to complain, to communicate their thoughts to others, 
… and to remonstrate in print against the public proceedings.”33 Endorsing an 
independent and corrective press, he insisted that “[t]he liberty of exposing and 
opposing a bad administration by the pen is among the necessary privileges of 
a free people, and is perhaps the greatest benefit that can be derived from the 
liberty of the press.”34
28. Ibid at 243.
29. Levy, supra note 9 at xxvi.
30. Trenchard & Gordon, supra note 18, vol 1 at 257.
31. Siebert, supra note 9 at 383.
32. Father of Candor, An Enquiry into the Doctrine, Lately Propagated, Concerning Libels, 
Warrants, and the Seizure of Papers (London: Publisher Unknown, 1764) at 31 
[emphasis in original].
33. Ibid [emphasis added].
34. Ibid at 32.
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Father of Candor also formulated remarkable procedural criticisms of seditious 
libel. Describing an ex officio information as “the exercise of … an unnecessary and 
grievous prerogative,”35 he cautioned that “[t]here is … no offence which is oftener 
prosecuted by an information, ex officio, than a libel.”36 Disapproving of “the ease 
and certainty of laying” an information,37 Father of Candor told of this practice 
silencing the press and intimidating printers with consequences “as terrible as 
a drawn sword suspended by a thread, hanging over their heads.”38 To protect 
publishers from arbitrary prosecutions and resultant libel chill, he advocated 
shifting to the Crown the legal burdens of falsehood and malice,39 a press-friendly 
modification not dissimilar to the actual malice rule. At last, while Father of 
Candor (like Cato) did not oppose seditious libels entirely,40 he endorsed the 
checking function rationale unreservedly, advising that “[a]nimadversions upon 
the conduct of ministers, submitted to the eye of the public in print, must in the 
nature of the thing be a great check upon their bad actions.”41
An increasingly refined conception of the press as a horizontal accountability 
mechanism was advanced in the Letters of Junius.42 Published anonymously from 
1769 to 1772, they contained strong arguments for press liberty and were inspired 
by a foreign-born legal theorist of immense creativity and insight, Jean-Louis De 
Lolme. In his opening “Dedication to the English Nation,” Junius celebrated the 
press as an essential component of libertarian thought, remarking that press liberty 
“is the Palladium of all the civil, political, and religious rights of an Englishman 
… . The power of King, Lords, and Commons is not an arbitrary power. They are 
the trustees, not the owners of the estate. The fee-simple is in US.”43
Further describing how the power exercised by “King, Lords, and Commons” 
is actually checked, Junius appealed to “the forms and principles of our particular 
constitution,”44 insisting that “a constant examination into the characters and 
conduct of ministers and magistrates should be … promoted and encouraged.”45 
In yet another strong endorsement of the checking function, the anonymous 
35. Ibid at 9 [emphasis added].
36. Ibid at 7 [emphasis in original].
37. Ibid at 8.
38. Ibid at 6.
39. Ibid at 11.
40. Ibid at 32.
41. Ibid at 29.
42. Junius, The Letters of Junius, vol 1-2 (London: Publisher Unknown, 1792).
43. Ibid at iv-v [emphasis in original].
44. Ibid at v.
45. Ibid at xiii.
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author professed: “They, who conceive that our newspapers are no restraint upon 
bad men, or impediment to the execution of bad measures, know nothing of 
this country.”46
Junius also endorsed Jean-Louis De Lolme, “a foreign writer, whose 
essay on the English constitution I beg leave to recommend to the public, 
as a performance, deep, solid and ingenious.”47 Considered as one of the two 
“most esteemed authors who have written upon the English Constitution” 
(alongside Blackstone),48 De Lolme, in The Constitution of England, examined 
the institutional preconditions for democratic accountability, particularly the 
institutional press.49
A fundamental aspect of these preconditions was maintaining an adversarial 
relationship between government and the press. At its base, De Lolme’s analysis 
was premised on “the censorial power, … the exercise of which (contrary to that 
of the legislative power) must be left to the people themselves.”50 Importantly, 
De Lolme knew that “this power cannot produce its intended effect any farther 
than [it] is made known and declared,”51 explaining that “it is this public notoriety 
of all things that constitutes the supplemental power, or check.”52 Appealing to 
their corrective effect, De Lolme endorsed newspapers as the censorial power’s 
utmost institutional manifestation, explaining that:
As [politicians] are thereby made sensible that all their actions are exposed to public 
view, they dare not venture upon those acts of partiality, those secret connivances at 
the iniquities of particular persons, or those vexatious practices which the man in 
office is but too apt to be guilty of, when, exercising his office at a distance from the 
public eye, and, as it were, in a corner, he is satisfied that, provided he be cautious, 
he may dispense with being just.53
Moreover, when the censorial power manifests in a strong and independent 
press, De Lolme expected that public officials “cannot conceal from themselves 
46. Ibid at xiii-xiv.
47. Ibid at xxix. See also Michael I Meyerson, “The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint 
Doctrine: Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the Separation of 
Powers” (2001) 34 Ind L Rev 295 at 312-13; Joseph Kary, “The Constitutionalization of 
Quebec Libel Law, 1848-2004” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall LJ 229 at 249-50; Charles & 
O’Neill, supra note 9.
48. Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 10th ed by Phillips Bradley (New York: Alfred 
A Knopf, 1966) vol 2 at 355.
49. Supra note 14.
50. Ibid at 170.
51. Ibid at 170-71 [emphasis added].
52. Ibid at 175.
53. Ibid at 176.
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the disagreeable truths which resound from all sides,”54 and must “put up even 
with ridicule.”55 Press liberty is therefore essential because “it enables the people 
effectually to exert those means which the constitution has bestowed on them, 
of influencing the motions of the government.”56
Evaluating the censorial power’s institutionalization in England, De Lolme 
noted approvingly that its constitution had “allotted to the people themselves 
the province of openly canvassing and arraigning the conduct of those who are 
invested with any branch of public authority.”57 As for newspapers themselves, 
De Lolme reassured Britons that “it scarcely ever happens that a subject, in which 
the laws, or, in general, the public welfare, are really concerned, fails to call 
forth some able writer, who … communicates to the public his observations 
and complaints.”58
In the end, De Lolme provides significant insight into the checking 
function rationale. Identifying censorial power as the wellspring of democratic 
accountability, De Lolme saw the press as a vital extra-governmental mechanism 
for holding power to account. Underappreciated in his time, De Lolme’s 
scholarship was exemplary,59 as shown by the following quixotic passage on the 
corrective effect of the press:
In short, whoever considers what it is that constitutes the moving principle of what 
we call great affairs, and the invincible sensibility of man to the opinion of his 
fellow-creatures, will not hesitate to affirm, that, if it were possible for the liberty of 
the press to exist in a despotic government, and (what is not less difficult) for it to 
exist without changing the constitution, this liberty would alone form a counterpoise 
to the power of the prince.60
3. CONTAINING AND RESTRICTING pOLITICAL pOWER
British libertarian thought entered a final phase following unsuccessful criminal 
prosecutions of the publication and sale of Letters of Junius in 1770.61 Critics 
such as Capel Lofft, James Adair, and Robert Hall redefined freedom of speech 
54. Ibid at 177.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid at 178 [emphasis added].
57. Ibid at 171-72.
58. Ibid at 176 [emphasis added].
59. See e.g. Meyerson, supra note 47 at 312. Meyerson notes that “John Adams referred to De 
Lolme’s books as ‘the best defence of the political balance of three powers that ever was 
written.’” De Lolme was also cited by the US Supreme Court in Near v Minnesota, 283 US 
697 at 714 (1931).
60. De Lolme, supra note 14 at 178 [emphasis added].
61. Siebert, supra note 9 at 385ff.
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and press liberty in two respects. First, they examined the nature and effects 
of political power, thereby clarifying its relationship to the press. Second, they 
progressively disavowed verbal political crimes.
Capel Lofft’s An Essay on the Law of Libels contained many reflections on 
democratic accountability.62 Emphasizing the impact of unchecked ambition on 
governmental stability, Lofft reasoned:
In every civil establishment that has any Constitution to lose, there is an incessant 
tendency to decay; the causes which produce this, power possessed and power to 
be acquired, wage everlasting war against the Freedom of the Whole. To reduce 
the excess of power as low as possible; to make it circulate so that the holders of 
it may be ever mindful they have a deposit, not a property; to have no member 
of the Community who can say he is not a sharer in its political rights; to have 
full information on constitutional franchises, and free investigation of public 
measures;—this it is to be a FREE PEOPLE.63
Endorsing newspapers as the preferred means for checking political 
misconduct, Lofft likened the press to the “Attorney General of the People,” 
explaining that “[a]s a defensive, remedial effort, great may be its use: by the very 
apprehension that it may be used, it is a check.”64
In Discussions of the Law of Libels,65 James Adair’s analysis extended to 
England’s political and constitutional structure.66 Observing that despots and 
governments forbid public libels only “as an atonement for the affront to his 
authority” or to protect “the government itself from censure,”67 Adair dismissed 
verbal political crimes as anti-democratic, concluding: “I doubt whether the mere 
defamation of the subject can, upon the principles of our government, ever be a 
public offence.”68
Similarly, in An Apology for the Freedom of the Press, and for General Liberty,69 
Robert Hall professed that “to suppress mere opinions by any other method than 
reason and argument, is the height of tyranny.”70 As with Adair, Hall cautiously 
grounded his argument in concerns with institutional design, noting that “[t]o 
62. Capel Lofft, An Essay on the Law of Libels (London: Publisher Unknown, 1785).
63. Ibid at 60-61.
64. Ibid at 60.
65. James Adair, Discussions of the Law of Libels as at Present Received, in Which its Authenticity is 
Examined (London: Publisher Unknown, 1785).
66. Ibid at 31.
67. Ibid at 31-32 [emphasis added].
68. Ibid at 30 [emphasis added].
69. Robert Hall, An Apology for the Freedom of the Press, and for General Liberty (London: 
Publisher Unknown, 1793).
70. Ibid at 18 [emphasis in original].
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render the magistrate a judge of truth, and engage his authority in the suppression 
of opinions, shews an inattention to the nature and design of political society.”71 
Exalting the press as a check on the power placed in government officials,72 Hall 
concluded: “[t]he controul of the public mind over the conduct of ministers 
exerted through the medium of the press, has been regarded by the best writers 
both in our country and on the continent, as the main support of our liberties.”73
B. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
1. RUDIMENTARy COMpARATIVE ANALySES
On the other side of the Atlantic, American theorists were likewise provoked by 
the Sedition Act,74 which criminalized “false, scandalous, or malicious writing” 
against President John Adams’s administration.75 Republican theorists George 
Hay,76 James Madison,77 and Tunis Wortman78 opposed this criminalization 
of political speech, arguing in some cases for absolutist interpretations of free 
expression and the press under the First Amendment.
Foremost among their concerns was discerning the institutional arrangements 
conducive to political accountability. George Hay’s An Essay on the Liberty of the 
Press provides an instructive example.79 Insisting that “freedom of the press” meant 
a “total exemption from any law making any publication whatever criminal,”80 
Hay delivered rudimentary comparative law reflections on British and American 
political and constitutional structures.
Supporters of the Sedition Act claimed that freedom of the press meant only 
exemption from prior restraint. Hay rejected this as extreme fallacy, predicting that 
within one year, “a press absolutely free, would … ‘humble in the dust and ashes,’ 
the ‘stupendous fabric,’ of the British government.”81 In statements calling for 
71. Ibid at 2.
72. Ibid at 8 [emphasis in original].
73. Ibid at 8.
74. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States, c 74, §1, 
1 Stat 596 (1798).
75. Ibid, s 2.
76. George Hay, An Essay on the Liberty of the Press (Philadelphia: Aurora Office, 1799).
77. James Madison, “The Virginia Report of 1799–1800” in Gaillard Hunt, ed, Writings of James 
Madison, 9 vols, vol 6 (New York: G P Putnam’s Sons, 1900-1910), at 341-406.
78. Tunis Wortman, A Treatise, Concerning Political Enquiry, and the Liberty of the Press (New 
York: George Forman, 1800).
79. Hay, supra note 76.
80. Ibid at 43 [emphasis added].
81. Ibid at 48.
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more subtle analysis, Hay reasoned that “[i]n Britain, a legislative control over the 
press, is, perhaps essential to the preservation of the ‘present order of things;’ but 
it does not follow, that such control is essential here.”82 Speculating on America’s 
need for a “total exemption of the press from any kind of legislative control,”83 
Hay noted disapprovingly that in England, “the parliament is acknowledged to 
be omnipotent. … In Britain there is no constitution, no limitation of legislative 
power.”84 But what escaped Hay’s notice was that parliamentarism might require 
a more independent, adversarial press precisely because of its limited institutional 
checks and balances. Without a codified constitution, judicial review of legislative 
enactments, or sharing of power amongst executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches, the press’s role in checking public officials arguably assumes greater 
importance for maintaining adequate accountability.
Another comparative analysis was provided by James Madison in his “Virginia 
Report of 1799–1800.”85 Madison advised that a prosecution for seditious libel 
“ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against that right of 
freely examining public characters and measures, … the only effectual guardian 
of every other right.”86 Should representatives misbehave, Madison observed: 
“[I]t is natural and proper, that … they should be brought into contempt or 
disrepute, and incur the hatred of the people.”87
Like Hay, Madison engaged in comparative analyses to “place this subject 
in the clearest light.”88 Noting that in Britain, “the danger of encroachments 
on the rights of the people is understood to be confined to the executive 
magistrate,”89 Madison argued that “[t]he representatives of the people in the 
Legislature are not only exempt themselves from distrust, but are considered as 
sufficient guardians of the rights of their constituents against the danger from the 
Executive.”90 He reasoned that “[u]nder such a government as this, an exemption 
of the press from previous restraint … is all the freedom that can be secured to 
it.”91 Republican governments, by comparison, “may well be supposed to require 
a greater freedom of animadversion than might be tolerated by the genius of such 
a government as that of Great Britain.”92
82. Ibid at 49.
83. Ibid at 50.
84. Ibid at 49.
85. Madison, supra note 77.
86. Ibid at 371-72.
87. Ibid at 394.
88. Ibid at 386.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid at 388.
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This analysis suffers similar defects. Writing in highly abstract terms, 
Madison does not specify who “understood” that “danger of encroachments on 
the rights of the people” was confined only to Britain’s executive branch.93 Surely 
Lofft, Adair, and Hall would not have capitulated on this point; all were aware 
of prosecutions against authors and printers for offences against parliamentary 
privilege.94 Moreover, it is unclear how differences concerning British and 
American constitutions logically entail Madison’s conclusions. As with Hay, the 
prospect that parliamentary governments require a stronger press to expose and 
check official misconduct was not considered.
2. A FREE AND INDEpENDENT pRESS
Greater institutional insight was provided by Tunis Wortman’s A Treatise 
Concerning Political Enquiry and the Liberty of the Press.95 Justly hailed as “an 
American masterpiece, the only equivalent on this side of the Atlantic to 
Milton and Mill,”96 Wortman’s piece employed a comparative approach fixed 
in a pessimistic understanding of human nature and a profound curiosity for 
discerning the structural nature of free institutions.
Wortman began by positing the revisionary power of society, a concept 
highly resonant with De Lolme’s censorial power. Comprising each individual’s 
right to determine whether government had discharged its obligations, the 
revisionary power necessitated “that Society should incessantly maintain a species 
of censorial jurisdiction over its political institutions.”97 Wortman explained that 
“[t]he Revisionary Right of Society is not peculiar to any particular form of civil 
institution: it is an inherent and fundamental right of our social existence.”98
Turning to public libels, Wortman observed that “[a]n unrestricted 
investigation of the conduct of Magistrates, is not only a necessary preventative 
of the encroachments of Ambition, but it is also the only preservative of Public 
Liberty which can be resorted to without endangering the tranquility of a State.”99 
Necessitating an independent and adversarial press, he reasoned that “Public 
Opinion should not only remain unconnected with Civil Authority, but be 
rendered superior to its controul.”100 The structure of the press as a “Fourth Estate” 
was perhaps nowhere more clearly apprehended than by Wortman.
93. Ibid at 386.
94. See Siebert, supra note 9 at 368-74.
95. Wortman, supra note 78.
96. Levy, supra note 9 at lxxii.
97. Wortman, supra note 78 at 125.
98. Ibid at 137 [emphasis added].
99. Ibid at 174 [emphasis added].
100. Ibid at 176 [emphasis added].
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Wortman unsurprisingly held the press in high regard. Noting that “[p]rinting 
may justly be considered as the most powerful benefactor of mankind,”101 
he commended the press as the “vigilant guardian of Public Liberty, whose 
eye can penetrate, and whose voice be heard, in every quarter of the State.”102 
Conceding with Lofft that “[a]ll Governments have an inevitable tendency to 
aspire,”103 Wortman defended the press in a seminal—if slightly hyperbolic—
passage worth citing in full:
It should always be remembered, that Government possesses an evident advantage 
and superiority over every species of opposition; it is a regular, disciplined, and 
organized corps; its moral and physical energies are concentrated and combined; 
it is capable of steady premeditation and continual design; it never loses sight of 
its object: but, with undeviating constancy, pursues its plans through the mazes 
of events, and in the midst of every obstacle. It is equally qualified to contrive and 
to execute: It perpetually exists, and slumbers not. Let it be added, it directs and 
commands all the resources of a State. Unless, therefore, some vigilant, powerful, 
and independent corrective is retained by Society, nothing can prevent its becoming 
the devoted victim of Despotism.104
Predictably, Wortman insisted that “[t]ruth can never be a libel,” adding 
that “[t]he system which maintains so odious a proposition, is founded in the 
most palpable injustice.”105 Wortman explained: “To maintain such doctrine, 
is to declare open war against Political Enquiry, [and] entirely destroy the 
responsibility of the Magistrate.”106
Still, despite exposing the institutional dynamics of the checking function, 
Wortman left unresolved the specific doctrinal implications of public libels that 
had intrigued Hay, Madison, and their Radical Whig predecessors, certain only 
of seditious libel that this “dangerous exotic can never be reconciled to the genius 
and constitution of a Representative Commonwealth.”107
C. CONCLUSION
Our review of libertarian theory reveals multiple points of interest. First, British 
and American theorists developed remarkably similar formulations of the press’s 
role in checking governmental power, thereby demonstrating its foundational 
101. Ibid at 241.
102. Ibid at 246.
103. Ibid at 175.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid at 252.
106. Ibid at 253.
107. Ibid at 262 [emphasis added].
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importance to democracy. Second, early formulations of the checking function 
probed issues of political and constitutional structure and debated as to which 
structure maximized political liberty and press freedom. As in De Lolme’s 
The Constitution of England,108 direct comparison with other political and 
constitutional structures was endorsed. Overall, compared with the mishandling 
of democratic models examined in Part II, this analysis demonstrates that 
accountability concerns were deeply embedded in early democratic theory 
and experience.
II. DISTINGUISHING DEMOCRATIC MODELS109
A. OVERVIEW
This part begins with a detailed comparison of Alexander Meiklejohn’s 
“self-governance” theory and Vincent Blasi’s “checking value” of the press. Since 
both models are routinely conflated in public libel jurisprudence, a precise 
understanding of their nature and differences is essential. We then identify two 
causes of this confusion: (1) free expression’s incomplete “core” of justifications, 
and (2) misguided attempts to subsume free expression’s multiple justifications 
under single-valued approaches.
B. DEMOCRATIC THEORIZING IN PUBLIC LIBEL JURISPRUDENCE
1. MEIKLEJOHN’S “SELF-GOVERNANCE” RATIONALE
Alexander Meiklejohn’s self-governance rationale occupies a leading position 
among free expression justifications, having been quickly and uncritically 
transplanted from its American constitutional context to Britain,110 
108. Supra note 14.
109. Part II is adapted from Stephenson, supra note 2, ch 2.
110. See John Gardner, “Freedom of Expression” in Christopher McCrudden & Gerald 
Chambers, eds, Individual Rights and the Law in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994) 209; Ian Loveland, “Reforming Libel Law: The Public Law Dimension” (1997) 46 
ICLQ 561; Ian Loveland, Political Libels: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Hart, 2000); Eric 
Barendt, “Why Protect Free Speech?” in Eric Barendt, ed, Freedom of Speech, 2nd ed (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) 1 at 18-21.
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Canada,111 and to a lesser extent, Australia112 and New Zealand.113 Yet, despite its 
popularity, Meiklejohnian theory is compromised not only by its absolutism and 
highly aspirational accounts of democratic citizenship, but also by an unwavering 
reluctance to recognize humanity’s shortcomings and contain its recurring abuses. 
Meiklejohnian theory therefore not only presents challenges as a practicable 
democratic model, but also appears opposed to the philosophy and principles 
underlying the US Constitution.114 Above all, Meiklejohn’s model contributes 
remarkably little to our understanding of political accountability. The democratic 
theory most transferrable across common law jurisdictions is thus conceivably 
not Meiklejohn’s, but rather the checking function, despite the former’s grip on 
constitutional theorizing and adjudication.
I. MEIKLEJOHN’S THEORy OF DEMOCRATIC “SELF-GOVERNANCE”
Writing in a post-war McCarthy era of political conformity and suppression of 
‘dangerous’ speech, Meiklejohn’s target in his essay “Free Speech and its Relation 
to Self-Government” was America’s prevailing doctrine of clear and present 
danger.115 Although originating earlier,116 this doctrine was most famously 
111. See Clare F Beckton, “Freedom of Expression in Canada – How Free?” (1983) 13 Man LJ 
583; Richard Moon, “The Scope of Freedom of Expression” (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ 331; 
A Wayne MacKay, “Freedom of Expression: Is It All Just Talk?” (1989) 68 Can Bar Rev 713; 
Keith Dubick, “The Theoretical Foundation for Protecting Freedom of Expression” (2001) 
13 NJCL 1; Jamie Cameron, “Does Section 2(b) Really Make a Difference? Part 1: Freedom 
of Expression, Defamation Law and the Journalist-Source Privilege” (2010) 51 SCLR 133; 
Benjamin Oliphant, “Freedom of the Press as a Discrete Constitutional Guarantee” (2013) 
59 McGill LJ 283.
112. See Timothy H Jones, “Freedom of Political Communication in Australia” (1996) 45 ICLQ 
392; Michael Chesterman, “Privileges and Freedoms for Defamatory Political Speech” 
(1997) 19 Adel L Rev 155; Adrienne Stone, “Freedom of Political Communication, the 
Constitution and the Common Law” (1998) 26 Federal L Rev 219; Jack M Balkin, “How 
Rights Change: Freedom of Speech in the Digital Era” (2004) 26 Sydney L Rev 5; William G 
Buss, “Alexander Meiklejohn, American Constitutional Law, and Australia’s Implied Freedom 
of Political Communication” (2006) 34 Federal L Rev 421.
113. See New Zealand Law Commission, “Defaming Politicians: A Response to Lange v 
Atkinson” (Preliminary Paper 33, September 1998); Guy Fiti Sinclair, “Parliamentary 
Privilege and the Polarisation of Constitutional Discourse in New Zealand” (2006) 14 
Waikato L Rev 80; New Zealand Law Commission, Reforming the Law of Sedition, Report 96 
(Wellington, NZ: March 2007), ch 3.
114. See Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Lay, The Federalist Papers, ed by Lawrence 
Goldman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 11, 51.
115. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, supra note 7 at 29ff.
116. Schenck v United States, 249 US 47 (1919), Holmes J.
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applied by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in Abrams v United States,117 which 
set out his marketplace of ideas metaphor and underlying reasoning.118
Foremost among Meiklejohn’s concerns was Justice Holmes’s depiction of 
human nature. Convinced that, despite his literary eloquence and rhetorical 
power, “the thinking of Mr. Holmes about the First Amendment [had] no 
such excellence,”119 Meiklejohn expressed grave doubt that Justice Holmes’s 
marketplace of ideas was anything but a “partial insight.”120 Alleging that 
excessive “individualism” and a pessimistic view of human nature would promote 
“intellectual irresponsibility,”121 Meiklejohn insisted that “[u]nder its influence, 
there are no standards for determining the difference between the true and 
the false,” and that “[t]he truth is what a man or an interest or a nation can 
get away with.”122
Unpersuaded by Holmes’s depiction, Meiklejohn provided an aspirational 
counterpoint, arguing that “one cannot understand the basic purposes of 
our Constitution … unless one sees them as a good man, a man who, in his 
political activities, is not merely fighting for what, under the law, he can get, but 
is eagerly and generously serving the common welfare.”123 Reproaching Justice 
Holmes’s failure to recognize these “sane and solid moral principles,” Meiklejohn 
championed a protective role for the First Amendment, arguing that “whatever 
else it may mean, the First Amendment is an expression of human goodness. 
That amendment, in its own field, stands guard over the general welfare of 
the community.”124
Contrastingly, Meiklejohn identified as the highest insight of political 
freedom that truth-seeking is simply instrumental to promoting democratic 
deliberation and the general welfare. While recognizing the First Amendment 
as “a device for the winning of new truth,” Meiklejohn clarified that its primary 
purpose was “to give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest 
117. 250 US 616 (1919) [Abrams].
118. Ibid at 630. Specifically, Holmes rejected restricting opinions except when they “so 
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law 
that an immediate check is required to save the country” (ibid).
119. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, supra note 7 at 61 [emphasis added].
120. Ibid at 73.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid at 74.
123. Ibid at 66.
124. Ibid at 68.
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possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which the 
citizens of a self-governing society must deal.”125
Contending that freedom of expression “springs from the necessities of the 
program of self-government,”126 Meiklejohn construed the First Amendment as “a 
deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by 
universal suffrage.”127 Besides the Preamble to the US Constitution,128 Meiklejohn 
emphasized two provisions informing the First Amendment. First, the guarantee 
of parliamentary privilege in Article 1, Section 6 provided a “prohibition against 
abridgment of the freedom of speech which is equally uncompromising, equally 
absolute, with that of the First Amendment.”129 According to Meiklejohn, since 
parliamentary privilege is essential to representative government, public discussion 
of its sovereign citizens requires identical protection. Meiklejohn instructed that 
“[t]he freedom which we grant to our representatives is merely a derivative of the 
prior freedom which belongs to us as voters.”130
Second, Meiklejohn claimed that the Fifth Amendment also clarifies 
America’s free speech commitments, which provides that “no person within the 
jurisdiction of the laws of the United States may be ‘deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.’”131 As the “liberty” referenced in the Fifth 
Amendment includes “liberty of speech,”132 Meiklejohn argued that the First and 
Fifth Amendments recognize two radically-different classes of utterances: Private 
speech, which may be abridged subject to due process guarantees, and public 
speech which, under the First Amendment, must receive absolute protection.133
Defending this strict separation of public and private discourse, Meiklejohn 
insisted that the First Amendment “was written to clear the way for thinking 
which serves the general welfare.”134 Compared to Justice Holmes and Professor 
Zechariah Chafee Jr., who defended the clear and present danger doctrine 
by emphasizing its importance for balancing public safety against truth,135 
Meiklejohn reminded Americans that “we have decided that the destruction of 
125. Ibid at 75 [emphasis added].
126. Ibid at 27.
127. Ibid [emphasis added].
128. US Const pmbl.
129. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, supra note 7 at 34-35.
130. Ibid at 36 [emphasis added].
131. Ibid [emphasis added].
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid at 37.
134. Ibid at 42.
135. See Zechariah Chafee Jr, Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1941).
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freedom is always unwise, that freedom is always expedient. … It is a reasoned 
and sober judgment as to the best available method of guarding the public 
safety.”136 Consequently, “no idea may be suppressed because someone in office, 
or out of office, has judged it to be ‘dangerous.’”137 Meiklejohn argued that the 
First Amendment’s “great declaration is that intellectual freedom is the necessary 
bulwark of the public safety. That declaration admits of no exceptions.”138
Consequently, Americans self-govern only insofar as their “deliberate and 
informed judgment-making is equipped with the power … to control and direct 
the pursuit of private interest in whatever way the public welfare may require.”139 
Besides unrestricted public debate, voting assumed paramount significance for 
Meiklejohn, who insisted that “we Americans are politically free only insofar 
as our voting is free.”140 His theory demands that “our judging of public 
issues, whether done separately or in groups, must be free and independent—
must be our own.”141
These electoral expectations also imply substantial social responsibilities, 
including reinforcing education to ensure citizens have mandatory minimum 
levels of civic understanding. Meiklejohn advised that “[w]e shall not understand 
the First Amendment unless we see that underlying it is the purpose that all the 
citizens of our self-governing society shall be ‘equally’ educated.”142 Accordingly, 
America must be “cultivating the general intelligence” of the people, a “heavy 
and basic responsibility” that Congress must promote.143 Idealizing the pastoral 
American town hall meeting, Meiklejohn stressed not “the words of the speakers, 
but the minds of the hearers. The final aim of the meeting is the voting of wise 
decisions.”144 In public life, “[w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall speak, 
but that everything worth saying shall be said.”145 Shared understanding and 
effective deliberation, not direct participation, were Meiklejohn’s overriding 
political concerns.
For example, prior to television and the Internet, Meiklejohn criticized 
commercial radio, denouncing it as “not engaged in the task of enlarging 
136. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, supra note 7 at 57.
137. Ibid at 79.
138. Ibid at 59 [emphasis added].
139. Ibid at 163.
140. Ibid at 116.
141. Ibid at 117.
142. Ibid at 86.
143. Ibid at 20.
144. Ibid at 26.
145. Ibid [emphasis added].
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and enriching human communication,” but rather being solely “engaged in 
making money.”146 Arguing that the radio had corrupted “both our morals 
and our intelligence,” Meiklejohn insisted that this precursor to modern mass 
communications revealed “how hollow may be the victories of the freedom of 
speech when our acceptance of the principle is merely formalistic.”147
And herein lies the self-limiting element in Meiklejohnian theory. By focusing 
on the moral characteristics deemed essential for self-government, Meiklejohn 
disregarded the well-known shortfalls in human nature that prompted America’s 
republican government in the first place. At last, while Meiklejohn admirably 
embraced the ideals of democratic rule, he contributed precious little to our 
understanding of democratic accountability, a seemingly inescapable conclusion 
after comparing his theory to the checking function of the press.
2. BLASI’S “CHECKING VALUE” OF THE pRESS
The dominant authority on the checking function rationale is Professor Vincent 
Blasi. In a well-documented review published in the American Bar Foundation 
Research Journal in 1977,148 Blasi advised that, along with traditional values 
underlying First Amendment theories, “free expression is valuable in part 
because of the function it performs in checking the abuse of official power.”149 
While First Amendment theories developed in the early-twentieth century 
emphasized three values: (1) autonomy; (2) truth-seeking and diversity, captured 
by the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor;150 and (3) “self-government,”151 Blasi 
nonetheless observed that, in the 1960s and 1970s, the value relevant to free 
speech claims and claimants before the US Supreme Court was the Federalist-era 
concern of “a free press … in checking the abuse of power by public officials.”152
I. CONSTITUTIVE pREMISES AND pHILOSOpHICAL SOURCES
Professor Blasi provided an authoritative definition of this checking value by 
classifying its five constitutive premises. Citing Radical Whigs such as Cato, 
Father of Candor, John Wilkes, and Junius, along with James Madison and 
Tunis Wortman—all advocating for a strong, independent press as a check 
146. Ibid at 87.
147. Ibid [emphasis added].
148. Blasi, “Checking,” supra note 7.
149. Ibid at 528.
150. Vincent Blasi, “Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas” (2004) 2004 Sup Ct Rev 1.
151. Blasi, “Checking,” supra note 7 at 524; Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, supra note 7.
152. Blasi, “Checking,” supra note 7 at 527.
STEpHENSON,  RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITy 39
on government—Blasi sought to better understand the checking function by 
examining “the sources of the value, the premises on which it rests, and the ways 
in which it differs from other values.”153
First, and most importantly, “[t]he central premise of the checking value 
is that the abuse of official power is an especially serious evil—more serious 
than the abuse of private power.”154 Blasi warned of government’s effects on 
individuals through its “significant investigative capabilities,” its ability to store 
and use “vast accumulations of data,” and its “capacity to employ legitimized 
violence.”155 Besides expressing concerns that the public “want[s] to believe in 
the trustworthiness of … officials,” Blasi warned of public officials acquiring “an 
inflated sense of self-importance,” and of greater social costs when “important 
expectations have been defeated” through official misconduct.156
The checking function’s second premise involves accepting “an essentially 
pessimistic view of human nature and human institutions.”157 Professor Blasi 
observed that “[h]uman beings have an unmistakable tendency to hurt each 
other, so much so that the prevention of man-made evil can be viewed as the 
most important task of all political arrangements.”158 Although proponents of the 
checking function might value free expression for other reasons, their primary 
concern will be encouraging the press’ “modest capacity to mitigate the human 
suffering that other humans cause,” especially the greater human suffering “caused 
by persons who hold public office.”159
Given the increasing size and complexity of contemporary democracies, 
a third premise posits a “need for well-organized, well-financed, professional 
critics to serve as a counterforce to government.”160 This requires critics 
proficient at “acquiring enough information to pass judgment on the actions 
of government,” who are “capable of disseminating their information and 
judgments to the general public.”161 Blasi cautioned that “if modern government 
were ever to gain complete control of the channels of mass communication or to 
incapacitate its professional critics in some other way, there would be no effective 
153. Ibid at 529.
154. Ibid at 538.
155. Ibid at 538-39.
156. Ibid at 540 [emphasis in original].
157. Ibid at 541.
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid.
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check on official misconduct,” a concern highly resonant with today’s era of 
digital communication and surveillance.162
The checking function also includes a fourth premise that “the general 
populace must be the ultimate judge of the behavior of public officials.”163 
Although implying a connection to democratic theory, Blasi rightly noted that 
“it is the democratic theory of John Locke and Joseph Schumpeter, not that of 
Alexander Meiklejohn.”164 While a proponent of the checking function might be 
a direct democrat, “in the sense of favoring a significant participatory role for the 
ordinary citizen in day-to-day governance,” Blasi surmised that he or she must 
“be at least a Lockean democrat,”165 in that the general population defines and 
enforces norms relating to official misconduct.
Finally, judging government officials implies a fifth premise: 
“[T]hat the concept of ‘misconduct’ has meaning in the context of governmental 
decision-making.”166 This implies “violation by public officials of norms that 
transcend a wide spectrum of policy differences.”167 Professor Blasi offered the 
following examples: (1) fraudulent behaviour violating criminal laws, such as 
“embezzlement or the acceptance of a bribe”; (2) unconstitutional behaviour; 
(3) improper involvement in foreign affairs, including “the deliberate bombing 
of civilians during wartime” and “the assassination of foreign political figures”; 
(4) “serious misrepresentations” made to government institutions or the public; 
and (5) using public office to augment one’s economic position.168 All told, 
the checking function provides a valuable supplement to traditional freedom 
of expression justifications, particularly in light of the considerable gaps in 
Meiklejohnian theory.
II. DISTINGUISHING THE CHECKING FUNCTION FROM TRADITIONAL 
JUSTIFICATIONS
Refining the checking function’s significance for constitutional adjudication, 
Professor Blasi outlined its dissimilarities to traditional free expression values. 
Committed to demonstrating its theoretical independence, he insisted that the 
checking function “could never replace the existing First Amendment value 
162. Ibid at 542.
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid.
168. Ibid at 543.
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matrix but rather should be viewed as potentially a vital additional component in 
that constellation of interdependent values.”169
Blasi first observed that a proponent of the checking function “views speech 
of a certain content as important because of its consequences: alerting the polity to 
the facts or implications of official behaviour, presumably triggering responses that 
will mitigate the ill effects.”170 Proponents of the autonomy value are, by contrast, 
“more concerned with the process of belief formation and communication; the 
value does not rest on any empirical propositions regarding the social effects 
of speech.”171 Moreover, due to autonomy’s “largely irreducible” nature, 
constitutional claims based on autonomy “tend to be absolute in nature.”172 
The checking function, however, is amenable to a balancing analysis involving 
“competing regulatory interests.”173 A final difference is that the checking function 
“supports doctrines that makes constitutional protection a function of who is 
speaking and what is being said,” suggesting “a distinctive constitutional role 
for certain specialized countervailing forces in the society and certain specialized 
speech and press activities.”174 Thus, “a proponent of the checking value places 
a premium on, and … may accord extraordinary constitutional protection to, 
speech … concerning the behavior of public officials.”175
Second, although the checking and truth-seeking values “both support 
the protection of speech because of its social consequences rather than on 
the basis of … intrinsic moral worth,”176 the checking function focuses on a 
much narrower concern; namely, scrutinizing public officials will produce more 
good—by preventing or containing official misconduct—than harm, such as 
“diminution in the efficiency of the public service or weakening of the trust that 
ultimately holds any political society together.”177 Thus, “exposing government 
misbehaviour might be accorded a level of constitutional protection higher than 
that accorded other speech activities which have only the more general effect of 
enhancing diversity.”178
169. Ibid at 548.
170. Ibid at 546 [emphasis in original].
171. Ibid [emphasis in original].
172. Ibid at 547.
173. Ibid.
174. Ibid at 547-48.
175. Ibid at 548.
176. Ibid at 551.
177. Ibid at 552.
178. Ibid at 552-53.
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Blasi also noted that while the checking and truth-seeking values similarly 
“focus on the interests of listeners and readers rather than speakers and writers,” 
the checking function emphasizes a narrower need for information about what 
the government is doing.179 This outweighs public advocacy, since, for Blasi, 
“[t]he moral and political implications of official behavior will often be apparent 
without extended public debate.”180 Thus, “[t]he most important stage in the 
checking process is typically that during which the public is first made aware of 
what is going on.”181 Acknowledging the checking function as an independent 
free expression value should then provide greater protection for “speech activities 
which relate to the dissemination of information divorced from advocacy.”182
Of course, Blasi accepted that distinguishing Meiklejohnian theory 
“requires the most extensive treatment.”183 Both theories focus on “political 
consequences of speech” and give special protection to political communications, 
both emphasize “readers and listeners,” and “both stem from democratic 
conceptions of sovereignty.”184 Blasi sensibly advised that “the checking value has 
the potential to influence First Amendment doctrine only insofar as it can be 
shown to have premises and implications significantly different from those of the 
self-government value.”185
According to Blasi, the most obvious difference is that “[t]he checking 
value focuses on the particular problem of misconduct by government officials,” 
whereas the self-government theory “makes no such narrow ordering.”186 In fact, 
Meiklejohn provides absolute protection to “all speech relevant to the process 
by which citizens decide how to vote.”187 According to Blasi, “[a] proponent of 
the checking value does not deny that myriad harms to the body politic may 
be forestalled by speech activities or that many goals of a democratic system of 
government may be served by … certain forms of communication.”188 But given 
the dangers of official misconduct, “its prevention and containment is a goal that 
takes precedence over all other goals of the political system.”189
179. Ibid at 553.
180. Ibid.
181. Ibid.
182. Ibid at 554.
183. Ibid at 544.
184. Ibid at 557-58.
185. Ibid at 558.
186. Ibid at 558-59.
187. Ibid at 559.
188. Ibid at 558.
189. Ibid.
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Another important difference is that the checking function permits balancing 
the consequences of speech activities, whereas constitutional protection for 
“self-governing” speech must be unqualified.190 As discussed above, for Meiklejohn, 
“any limitation imposed by the agents of the people on the self-governing speech 
of citizens is simply an impossible notion under our political compact.”191 
Although the checking function is consistent with private or group interest 
political theories, Blasi rightly observed that “the [checking] value is especially 
important in a society characterized to a large degree by competition and the 
pursuit of private satisfaction.”192
Finally, Professor Blasi noted two differences of emphasis. First, Meiklejohn 
places “slightly more emphasis on argumentation … than does the checking 
value.”193 The checking function emphasizes “shortage of information” as the 
most serious issue relating to political problems.194 Second, the two models view 
social and political elites differently. Blasi rightly noted that “Meiklejohn [was] 
reluctant to assign a special role in the governmental system to any group of 
people.”195 Public officials were understood as “agents of the collective political 
will.”196 By contrast, since “a proponent of the checking value sees political 
decision-making more as a product of contending forces and counterforces,”197 
“public officials” are seen as “potential oppressors rather than as … agents.”198 
This view recognizes that “public officials are qualitatively different from ordinary 
voters” and that they can be “effectively checked … by other elite groups with 
similarly specialized powers, skills, and attitudes.”199 Besides organized political 
opposition, another elite counterforce is the institutional press. According to 
Blasi, only the checking function highlights this structural role and justifies 
treating “journalists differently than ordinary citizens in determining what rights 
are guaranteed by the First Amendment.”200
As illustrated in Table 1, each model highlights different aspects of 
democratic governance. Specifically, where Meiklejohn emphasizes deliberative 
190. Ibid at 559.
191. Ibid.
192. Ibid at 563.
193. Ibid.
194. Ibid.
195. Ibid.
196. Ibid [emphasis added].
197. Ibid.
198. Ibid at 564.
199. Ibid.
200. Ibid.
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democracy and the press’s role in facilitating electoral decision making, the 
checking function focuses on political accountability and the liberal watchdog 
function of the press. Still, despite their considerable differences, legal scholars 
have complicated matters by failing to differentiate them. As examined below, 
difficulties marshalling democratic theory are due both to incomplete articulations 
of freedom of expression’s core justifications and misguided attempts to subsume 
these core values under various single-valued approaches. In both instances, the 
theoretical differences characterizing each model are obscured.
TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF MEIKLEJOHN’S AND BLASI’S MODELS OF 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Meiklejohn’s “Self-Governance” Theory Blasi’s “Checking Value” of the Press
Emphasizes deliberation and promoting 
general welfare
Emphasizes accountability and exposing 
political misconduct
Political representatives viewed as agents Political representatives viewed as potential oppressors
Idealized view of democratic rule and human 
nature
Pessimistic view of human nature and 
democratic institutions
Focuses on and protects all speech relevant to 
electoral issues
Focuses specifically on misconduct by 
government officials
Emphasizes argumentation as part of delibera-
tive process
Emphasizes shortage of information about 
political power
Press conceptualized as a conduit for 
information
Press conceptualized as a “fourth estate” or 
independent watchdog
Occupies leading position among democratic 
freedom of expression justifications worldwide
Has been marginalized and discounted by 
judges, legislators, and legal academics
C. FREE EXPRESSION’S INCOMPLETE “CORE”
Although defamation law has long recognized freedom of expression’s 
significance,201 underlying free speech justifications have only recently been 
201. See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1765-1769) vol 4 at 150-53; George Chase, “Criticism of Public Officers and Candidates 
for Office” (1889) 23 Am L Rev 346; Hugh Fraser, “The Privileges of the Press in Relation 
to the Law of Libel” (1891) 7 Law Q Rev 158; Van Vechten Veeder, “Freedom of Public 
Discussion” (1910) 23 Harv L Rev 413.
STEpHENSON,  RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITy 45
recognized by courts and commentators. Despite seminal defences by John Milton 
and John Stuart Mill,202 as well as twentieth-century contributions by Justices 
Holmes and Brandeis of the US Supreme Court,203 the current popularized core 
of free expression justifications originated with Thomas Emerson’s 1962-1963 
article “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment.”204 In his article, 
Professor Emerson explored the relationships between the First Amendment’s 
philosophical rationales, general principles, and specific doctrines. Crucially, 
this American-borne analysis was supported by a far-reaching classification of 
four free speech rationales central to the modern “liberal constitutional state.” 
Emerson instructed:
Maintenance of a system of free expression is necessary (1) as assuring individual 
self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing 
participation by the members of the society in social, including political, decision-
making, and (4) as maintaining the balance between stability and change in the 
society.205
Eliciting Meiklejohn’s democratic self-governance theory,206 Emerson stated 
ambiguously that “[t]he crucial point, however, is not that freedom of expression is 
politically useful, but that it is indispensable to the operation of a democratic form 
of government.”207 Stressing the American electorate’s deliberative requirement 
for “full freedom of expression both in forming individual judgments and in 
forming the common judgment,”208 Emerson’s account of democracy owed very 
little (if anything) to notions of democratic accountability.
202. See Milton, supra note 10; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: John W Parker 
and Son, 1859).
203. See Abrams, supra note 117; Whitney v California, 274 US 357 (1927).
204. Thomas I Emerson, “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment” (1962-1963) 
72 Yale LJ 877.
205. Ibid at 878-79 [emphasis added]. For truth-seeking, see Stanley Ingber, “The Marketplace 
of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth” (1984) Duke LJ 1; Christopher T Wonnell, “Truth and the 
Marketplace of Ideas” (1986) 19 UC Davis L Rev 669; William P Marshall, “In Defense 
of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification” (1995) 30 Ga L Rev 1. For 
autonomy, see Brian C Murchison, “Speech and the Self-Realization Value” (1998) 33 
Harv CR-CLL Rev 443; C Edwin Baker, “Autonomy and Free Speech” (2011) 27 Const 
Commentary 251. For democratic self-governance, see Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, supra 
note 7; Meiklejohn, “The First Amendment,” supra note 7; Brian C Murchison, “Speech 
and the Self-Governance Value” (2006) 14 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 1251; Robert Post, 
“Participatory Democracy and Free Speech” (2011) 97 Va L Rev 477.
206. See Meiklejohn, Political Freedom, supra note 7.
207. Supra note 204 at 883.
208. Ibid.
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Although predating influential judgments and academic commentary 
endorsing watchdog journalism and the press,209 Emerson’s article has nevertheless 
assumed an authoritative status on free speech justifications, both within and—
more remarkably—outside America.210 Unfortunately, Emerson’s free speech 
taxonomy was deficient from inception, notably overlooking the checking 
function rationale. Demonstrating the doctrinal implications of his closed 
inventory of free expression values, Emerson insisted that “alternative principles 
have no substantial support, and that our system of freedom of expression must 
be based upon and designed for the realization of the fundamental propositions 
embodied in the traditional theory.”211
Emerson’s omission of accountability concerns was all the more surprising 
given his otherwise keen awareness of threats to political liberty in post-war 
America. Emerson identified the mounting impact of “industrialization, 
urbanization and the proliferation of organization,”212 each, in his view, giving 
rise to increasing threats to freedom of expression, which prompted his cautioning 
that “the danger of distorting legitimate powers for illegitimate purposes has 
become acute.”213 Building on this last point, Emerson noted significant changes 
centering on “the impact of mass public opinion.”214 Sounding more like 
Herbert Marcuse and the Frankfurt School than a liberal constitutional theorist, 
he observed that “[m]odern government strives to achieve unity and control more 
by the manipulation of public attitudes and opinion than by direct application of 
official sanctions.”215
209. See Sullivan, supra note 4; Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press” (1975) 26 Hastings LJ 631; 
Blasi, “Checking,” supra note 7; Anthony Lewis, “Keynote Address: The Right to Scrutinize 
Government: Toward a First Amendment Theory of Accountability” (1980) 34 U Miami 
L Rev 793; Timothy W Gleason, The Watchdog Concept: The Press and the Courts in 
Nineteenth-Century America (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1990).
210. See e.g. Ford v Québec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 SCR 712 at 765 [Ford], where Emerson’s 
traditional core of justifications was adopted for litigating free expression cases under 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. See also Stefan Braun, “Freedom of 
Expression v. Obscenity Censorship: The Developing Canadian Jurisprudence” (1985-1986) 
50 Sask L Rev 39 at 42; Dubick, supra note 111 at 7; Robin Elliot, “The Supreme Court’s 
Understanding of the Democratic Self-Government, Advancement of Truth and Knowledge 
and Individual Self-Realization Rationales for Protecting Freedom of Expression: Part I – 
Taking Stock” (2012) 59 SCLR (2d) 435 at 443.
211. Supra note 204 at 886.
212. Ibid at 901.
213. Ibid at 902.
214. Ibid.
215. Ibid at 903.
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But rather than highlight the institutional press as a countervailing 
mechanism, Emerson appealed only to the rule of law and judicial institutions 
for “the maintenance of a system of freedom of expression.”216 Therefore, despite 
describing concerns that would have prompted Radical Whigs into pleas for 
increased press liberty, concerns with democratic accountability were neither 
formally embedded in Emerson’s inventory of free expression justifications 
nor acknowledged more generally. As demonstrated by the Supreme Court of 
Canada,217 unless courts and legislatures are conversant with the checking function 
rationale, there is a real risk that Emerson’s inventory of core justifications could 
be misinterpreted as a complete code.
D. NECESSITY FOR MULTI-VALUED THEORIZING
Another barrier to democratic theorizing is worth exploring. Following publication 
of Emerson’s article, many legal scholars attempted to resolve perceptions of 
incoherence in free speech jurisprudence by subsuming traditional justifications 
under various single-valued approaches.218 Among the theoretical aspirants were 
Meiklejohn’s democratic “self-governance” rationale,219 “self-realization,”220 
“participatory democracy,”221 “believing persons,”222 and even an adaptation of 
Habermas’s theory of “communicative action.”223 Although not all single-valued 
approaches were exclusionary, all necessarily marginalized lower-ranked rationales.
The most marginalized theory was the checking function of the press. 
In a controversial 1982 article prophetically titled “The Value of Free Speech,” 
216. Ibid.
217. See Ford, supra note 210.
218. See e.g. Robert H Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems” (1971) 
47 Ind LJ 1; Lillian R BeVier, “The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry 
into the Substance and Limits of Principle” (1978) 30 Stan L Rev 299 [BeVier, “The First 
Amendment”]; Lillian R BeVier, “An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search 
for a Constitutional Principle” (1980) 68 Cal L Rev 482; Martin H Redish, “The Value 
of Free Speech” (1982) 130 U Pa L Rev 591; Michael J Perry, “Freedom of Expression: 
An Essay on Theory and Doctrine” (1983) 78 Nw UL Rev 1137; Lawrence B Solum, 
“Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech” 
(1989) 83 Nw UL Rev 54; Steven D Smith, “Believing Persons, Personal Believings: The 
Neglected Center of the First Amendment” (2002) U Ill L Rev 1233; James Weinstein, 
“Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine” (2011) 
97 Va L Rev 491.
219. Bork, supra note 218; BeVier, “The First Amendment,” supra note 218.
220. Redish, supra note 218; Perry, supra note 218.
221. Weinstein, supra note 218.
222. Smith, supra note 218.
223. Solum, supra note 218.
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Professor Martin Redish argued that Emerson’s classic free expression justifications 
were best subsumed under the “one true value” of “individual self-realization.”224 
Claiming that Emerson’s justifications were “in reality subvalues of self-realization,” 
Redish also targeted multi-valued approaches more generally, insisting that it 
was “inaccurate to suggest that ‘the commitment to free expression embodie[s] 
a complex of values.’”225 After dismissing Emerson’s core justifications, Redish 
observed that “Professor Blasi’s ‘checking function’ appear[ed] strikingly similar 
to the ‘democratic process’ value of Meiklejohn.”226 In an instructive case of 
misguided reliance on formal logic, Redish dismissed the checking function as 
only a derivative of “self-realization,” reasoning incautiously that “[b]ecause the 
checking function ultimately derives from the principle of democratic self-rule, 
and because that principle in turn follows from the self-realization value, the 
checking function is merely one concrete manifestation of the much broader 
self-realization value.”227
The difficulties with this overly reductionist, single-valued approach are many. 
First, Redish’s interpretation of the checking function was curt and dismissive, 
failing to engage with its “constitutive premises” and Blasi’s considerable efforts 
to distinguish it from traditional free expression theories.228 Second, Redish 
discussed the checking function in highly abstract terms, without scrutinizing 
its relationship to particular doctrinal issues, such as its role in public libel 
doctrine. Without anchoring his discussion in paradigmatic examples of official 
misconduct, it is difficult to appreciate how one might prefer self-realization 
or any other free expression justification over the checking function for factual 
relevance or exegetical power.
Lastly, Redish’s argument minimized crucial distinctions between democratic 
self-governance and the checking function that reveal themselves principally in 
the context of public libels. It is precisely the factual details of official misconduct 
and abuse of governmental power that ensure an accurate and credible balancing 
of free expression against reputation. That is, it matters greatly for selecting 
doctrine whether freedom of expression’s side of the equation is properly 
weighted. Epistemologically, Redish’s argument races to progressively higher 
levels of abstraction at the expense of a sharper and more complete understanding 
224. Supra note 218 at 593.
225. Ibid at 594, quoting Blasi, “Checking,” supra note 7 at 538.
226. Ibid at 613, n 77.
227. Ibid at 615-16.
228. With few exceptions, legal scholars have cited the checking function only to conflate it with 
higher-level abstractions.
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of the checking function’s contextual relevance and distinctive relationship to 
democratic theory. Simply put, as with all abstraction, it is in consequence most 
notable for what it leaves out.
Professor Michael Perry has also dismissed the checking function by 
appealing to a simple criterion of whether a proposed theory adds any “additional 
normative content” to freedom of expression.229 In an illustrative example of this 
similarly misguided approach, Perry reasoned that since Meiklejohnian theory 
“calls for protecting information and ideas useful in evaluating public policy 
and performance,”230 information on abuses of authority does not add anything 
further. Perry’s dismissal of the checking function is thus comprised of one simple, 
highly abstract statement regarding potential overlap of information relevant to 
both values. This broad and undifferentiated understanding of Meiklejohnian 
theory and the checking function evidences the dangers of disregarding their 
differences in emphasis and relevance to specific factual contexts. What Professors 
Perry and Redish fail to consider is that the checking function might provide 
uniquely sound reasons to weigh freedom of expression more heavily in some 
factual contexts than in others, particularly in cases where governments, 
politicians, and certain public figures attempt to use defamation law to silence 
the press from publishing matters of public interest to mass audiences.
Fortunately, these methodological concerns have attracted other eminent 
constitutional law scholars.231 The leading light on such matters is arguably 
Professor Frederick Schauer who, in contrast to those crusading for one true 
free expression theory, supports a seemingly less splendid multi-valued approach. 
Although advising that “[a]ttempting to apply the first amendment without 
some theoretical vision of free speech is mere stumbling in the dark,”232 Schauer 
cautioned against the pitfalls of the single-valued approaches endorsed by 
Professors Redish and Perry, confirming that “it is unlikely that any one theory 
229. Supra note 218 at 1159.
230. Ibid at 1152, n 62. For a Canadian example, see David Fewer, “Constitutionalizing 
Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the Limits of Copyright in Canada” (1997) 55 UT 
Fac L Rev 175 at 193-94.
231. See e.g. Frederick Schauer, “Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts” 
(1981) 34 Vand L Rev 265 [Schauer, “Categories”]; Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: 
A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Pierre J 
Schlag, “An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech” (1983) 30 UCLA L 
Rev 671; Steven Shiffrin, “Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship” (1983) 30 UCLA 
L Rev 1103; Frederick Schauer, “Must Speech be Special?” (1983) 78 Nw UL Rev 1284; 
Frederick Schauer, “Public Figures” (1984) 25 Wm & Mary L Rev 905 [Schauer, “Public 
Figures”]; Kent Greenawalt, “Free Speech Justifications” (1989) 89 Colum L Rev 119.
232. Schauer, “Categories,” supra note 231 at 291-92, n 124.
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can explain the concept of free speech, and no reason necessarily exists to suppose 
that it could.”233 Not long after, Professor Schauer concluded more definitively 
that “[t]o view the first amendment as being grounded in one and only one 
theoretical justification is a mistake.”234
Columbia Law Professor Kent Greenawalt has also argued that single, 
unifying justifications for free expression risk either obscuring or oversimplifying 
its interrelated rationales. In “Free Speech Justifications,”235 Greenawalt posited 
a loose constellation of reasons, subjects, and sub-principles of free expression. 
Explaining the now familiar single-valued strategy of inclusion used by Professor 
Redish,236 whereby free expression values are subsumed under a broader theory, 
Greenawalt sensibly advised that “any reason broad enough to yield a plausible 
claim that it includes everything else is bound to be extremely general and vague.”237 
Citing Blasi’s checking value as an instructive example, Greenawalt opposed the 
single-valued methodologies of Professors Redish and Perry, advising that “[t]he 
value of free speech for accountable government may be underestimated if only 
the relationship to individual fulfillment is addressed.”238
An orientation toward practical thought is therefore paramount for 
Greenawalt, requiring a more bottom-up and contextual approach to 
constitutional theorizing. For example, when considering the checking function 
as a free expression value of “historical significance and central importance … 
powerfully developed by Vincent Blasi,” Greenawalt observed that it seemed 
“[c]losely linked to truth discovery and interests accommodation.”239 However, 
demonstrating the power of his prescriptions for preserving the checking function’s 
theoretical independence, Greenawalt stressed that “a critical press affects how 
officials and citizens regard the exercise of government power, subtly supporting 
the notion that government service is a responsibility, not an opportunity for 
personal advantage.”240
In the end, given the alarming acts of corruption that too often typify public 
libel cases, Professor Greenawalt’s sensitivity to differing emphases of democratic 
free expression theories seems a sensible approach worth preserving.
233. Ibid at 276-77 [emphasis in original].
234. Schauer, “Public Figures,” supra note 231 at 930.
235. Supra note 231.
236. The other being “elimination,” whereby aspirants are discarded for overlapping significantly 
with other values (ibid at 126).
237. Ibid at 126 [emphasis added].
238. Ibid at 127.
239. Ibid at 142.
240. Ibid at 143 [emphasis added].
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFAMATION LAW REFORM
A. THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC LIBEL LAW
This undertheorizing of democratic free expression values has had drastic effects 
on public libel jurisprudence. Making matters worse, when it is viewed from 
a comparative law perspective, there appears to be no criteria by which judges 
and legislators select their doctrinal approaches.241 Other than comprehensively 
rejecting the actual malice rule outside America,242 leading courts and legislatures 
effectively provide no theoretical justifications for their preferred solutions.243
For example, in Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd,244 a majority 
of Australia’s High Court attempted to justify its unprecedented expansion of 
qualified privilege principles by concluding imprecisely, “[t]he formula we favour 
redresses the balance to some extent in favour of the plaintiff; as much, in our 
view, as can legitimately be achieved without significantly interfering with free 
communication.”245 Besides dismissing US doctrine, the High Court’s reasons for 
judgment omitted any criteria by which this statement could be assessed. Similarly, 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s constitutional analysis in Grant was contained in 
one short paragraph. Clearly preferring a doctrinal middle road bifurcating the 
actual malice rule and the defence of qualified privilege, Chief Justice McLachlin 
concluded: “In my view, the third option, buttressed by the argument from 
Charter principles advanced earlier, represents a reasonable and proportionate 
response to the need to protect reputation while sustaining the public exchange 
of information that is vital to modern Canadian society.”246 Besides overlooking 
the checking function in its “argument from Charter principles,”247 the Court’s 
legal analysis also lacked evaluative criteria.
Where theoretical justifications are attempted, judges and legislators have 
disregarded accountability and the checking function rationale when appealing 
to democratic theory, thus selecting less press-friendly doctrine than required. For 
241. Stephenson, supra note 2, ch 1.
242. See generally Mark Tushnet, “New York Times v. Sullivan Around the World” (2014) 66 Ala 
L Rev 337. See also Paul Horwitz, “Introduction: Still Learning from New York Times v. 
Sullivan” (2014) 66 Ala L Rev 221.
243. See e.g. Theophanous, supra note 4 at 140; Lange v Atkinson & Australian Consolidated Press 
NZ Ltd, [1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC) at 37; Lange, 1998, supra note 4 at 451, 467; Reynolds, 
supra note 4 at 203, 204, 210, 219; Grant, supra note 4 at paras 57, 89.
244. Theophanous, supra note 4.
245. Ibid at 140.
246. Grant, supra note 4 at para 86.
247. Ibid.
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instance, in Reynolds,248 the House of Lords rejected a generic qualified privilege 
based on the actual malice rule. Lord Nicholls, who wrote the leading speech, 
concluded unconvincingly that the newspaper’s attempt to distinguish political 
discussion from other matters of public interest was “unsound in principle,”249 
and “lack[ed] a coherent rationale.”250 Lord Cooke also asserted that there was “no 
good reason” why politicians and public officials should be subjected to greater 
risk of false allegations of fact in the media.251 Importantly, these claims were 
made without the benefits of comparative law analysis or careful reflections on the 
doctrinal implications of pertinent free expression justifications.252 Collectively, 
this undertheorizing has led to widespread over- and under-protection of political 
speech and expression worldwide.253
The effects of these errors intensify when a revised theoretical framework is 
offered for consideration. As I have proposed, by adjusting public libel doctrine 
(i.e., press regulation) to a jurisdiction’s background accountability profile, law 
reform efforts must focus on assessing the cumulative effects of eight accountability 
mechanisms.254 Rather than adjusting public libel doctrine linearly to only one 
variable (e.g., reputation), doctrine is selected to mitigate exposed “accountability 
dysfunctions,” be they deficits or overloads.255 This requires evaluating 
accountability networks from a systems perspective, essentially adjusting the 
press’s checking function to restore an optimal balance of accountability in 
each jurisdiction.
This is perhaps best grasped by applying this proposed framework to the 
United Kingdom, where it generates unexpected, but theoretically sound, reforms. 
As detailed elsewhere,256 despite the additional sources of information generated 
248. Supra note 4.
249. Ibid at 204 (Lord Nicholls).
250. Ibid at 203 (Lord Nicholls).
251. Ibid at 219 (Lord Cooke).
252. In fact, the House of Lords overlooked an important line of Strasbourg jurisprudence 
consistent with the checking function rationale that it was obliged to consider under the 
Human Rights Act 1998. See Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), c 42, s 6(1). See e.g. Sunday 
Times v United Kingdom (1979), 2 EHRR 245; Lingens v Austria (1986), 8 EHRR 407; 
Castells v Spain, 14 EHRR 445.
253. Stephenson, supra note 2, Part B.
254. Ibid at 186. These mechanisms consist of two groups. The “primary” mechanisms represent 
those relatively fixed elements of constitutional design, including: (1) parliamentary/
presidential structure; (2) federal/unitary structure; (3) electoral structure; (4) legislative 
mechanisms; and (5) judicial review. The “secondary” mechanisms represent those 
comparatively dynamic elements, consisting of: (1) government auditors; (2) independent 
regulators; and (3) direct public access mechanisms.
255. Ibid at 170-73.
256. Ibid at 199-220.
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by its mechanisms of legislative scrutiny (i.e., official reports, departmental 
select committees, and constituency opinion polling), Britain remains beset by 
widespread transparency concerns associated with its parliamentary structure and 
its convention of ministerial responsibility.257 To be exact, parliamentary systems 
lack the monitoring capacity of their presidential counterparts, a concern that 
is only exacerbated by their system of ministerial responsibility, which increases 
the probability that important policy making takes place “behind closed 
doors.”258 In addition, owing to restrictions on citizen access to the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman, and the substantial number of exemptions undermining access to 
information under Britain’s freedom of information legislation, there remains 
considerable need for supplemental accountability mechanisms to mitigate these 
transparency concerns.259
Given this accountability “deficit,” the most appropriate doctrinal approach 
for the United Kingdom is arguably a generic privilege similar to the actual malice 
rule.260 Alternatively, Britain’s new statutory defence of “Publication on Matter 
of Public Interest” can be adapted by adding presumptions of “public interest” 
and “reasonable belief ” rebuttable on “clear and convincing” evidence to the 
contrary.261 Crucially, both doctrinal options provide more direct assurances for 
media defendants by triggering enhanced doctrinal protection to generate and 
report on accountability news when the subjects of their publications engage 
pivotal accountability concerns characteristic of the checking function rationale.262 
In the end, regardless of the approach taken, the problem of public libel law 
highlights the importance of achieving sound doctrine by exposing underlying 
problems obscured by differences in legal doctrine and technique, and by 
identifying and repairing significant disruptions in the theory−doctrine interface.
B. FIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CANADIAN DEFAMATION LAW REFORM
Besides illuminating the disruptive effects of democratic undertheorizing on 
public libel law, our enquiry yields five recommendations for contemporary 
defamation law reforms.
257. Ibid at 220.
258. Kaare Strøm, “Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation” in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C 
Müller & Torbjörn Bergman, eds, Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 96. See also Kaare Strøm, “Delegation 
and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies” (2000) 37 European J of Political 
Research 261 at 274.
259. Stephenson, supra note 2 at 220.
260. Ibid at 223-24.
261. Ibid at 224.
262. Ibid at 228.
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1. NO ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL SOLUTIONS
First, as evidenced by the problem of public libel law, doctrine must be adapted 
to different libel plaintiffs and to a jurisdiction’s distinctive institutional 
context. A one-size-fits-all approach is thus unacceptable since it presupposes 
a false-to-facts identity of structure and accountability dynamics across 
jurisdictions. For instance, since libel plaintiffs such as governments, politicians, 
and influential public figures and corporations similarly threaten democratic 
legitimacy, applying the checking function rationale prima facie maximizes the 
selection of doctrine most conducive to generating and reporting accountability 
news. However, this is not the end of the analysis. Appropriate doctrine must 
ultimately be attained using a broader framework that gauges a jurisdiction’s actual 
accountability profile, which may require further doctrinal adjustment. With so 
many independent variables to assess, a single solution is highly improbable, not 
only between jurisdictions, but within single jurisdictions where libel plaintiffs 
elicit more or less concern with political and public misconduct.
A one-size-fits-all approach is also inconsistent with recent advances in First 
Amendment scholarship that place renewed emphasis upon institutions and how 
they affect First Amendment jurisprudence.263 Arguing that First Amendment 
law is in crisis, Paul Horwitz’s structural institutionalism moves beyond the 
conventional application of acontextual rules and principles toward alternatives 
rooted in contextual realities and the unique characteristics of institutional actors. 
Besides being responsive to institutional context and changing social realities, 
as in public libel jurisprudence, Professor Horwitz insists that free speech 
principles should be developed more empirically from the bottom up.
Finally, due to our increased capacity for adapting doctrine to a jurisdiction’s 
institutional milieu, a contextually sensitive approach provides a much more 
promising basis for regulating the intricacies of global defamation regimes than 
imposing uniform doctrine across different forms of representative democracy.264
2. IMpORTANCE OF COMpARATIVE LAW METHODOLOGy
A second recommendation is to recognize the importance of comparative law 
analysis, especially for diagnosing underlying problems that technical differences 
in legal doctrine routinely obscure. As evidenced by public libel jurisprudence, 
263. See Paul Horwitz, First Amendment Institutions (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2013).
264. See e.g. Lee C Bollinger, Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open: A Free Press for a New Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) ch 3.
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it is only by adopting a comparative law perspective that the veiled issue of a 
missing selection theory emerges. That is, a homespun lawyer will not easily 
discern that significant problems exist with domestic public libel doctrine by 
examining their law in isolation. Rather, any underlying issues are best exposed 
by comparing one’s domestic law with approaches from other jurisdictions. In the 
end, increasing our comparative law awareness reduces risks that our domestic 
laws fail to reflect our constitutional values and institutional dynamics.
Similarly, given the increasing challenges of the Internet to defamation law in 
general, one would expect that our law making would only improve by avoiding 
domestic exceptionalism and seeking to understand how other nations attempt to 
solve similar problems through variations in libel doctrine and technique. In the 
end, comparative law research not only tests the soundness and efficacy of our 
existing laws, but also guides our reforms with upmost insight and precision.265
3. RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITy IN DEMOCRATIC THEORy
Third, it is long overdue that the checking function rationale be added to 
Canada’s inventory of free expression justifications. As we have seen, Canada’s 
current triumvirate of free expression values owes its origins to the incorporation 
of Professor Emerson’s core justifications in Ford v Québec (Attorney General).266 
Since Emerson’s model did not specify or contain the checking function rationale, 
it was not picked up by the Court, leaving Canadian courts little choice but to 
shoehorn accountability concerns into less relevant theoretical rationales, most 
commonly the truth-seeking justification.
Moreover, given the importance of defamation principles to regulating press 
freedom, the problem of public libel law has shown that our ability to accurately 
balance free expression and reputation is impaired without a democratic model 
that highlights accountability concerns and the checking function of the press. 
Importantly, while accountability concerns persist regardless of whether false 
defamatory statements of fact are widely published in print or online forms, 
there is an increasing danger that, without a democratic free expression theory 
resonant with the checking function rationale, the ever-increasing speed and 
reach of digital publications will dominate the process of doctrine selection out of 
singular concern with technology’s detrimental effects on reputational interests.
265. See Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed translated by 
Tony Weir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
266. Ford, supra note 210 at 764-65.
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4. IDENTIFyING AND AppLyING ALL RELEVANT FREE EXpRESSION 
JUSTIFICATIONS
A fourth recommendation based on our enquiry into public libel law’s 
undertheorizing dilemma is that regardless of the doctrinal approach adopted 
by courts and legislatures (i.e., ad hoc balancing, categoricalism), all relevant 
free expression justifications must be identified, tabled, and overcome. This 
is particularly important where doctrinal alternatives involve the balancing 
of competing rights, interests, and values. As seen in the context of public 
libel law, any significant disjunction between defamation principles and free 
expression theory compromises the delicate balancing of freedom of expression 
against reputation. This inevitably produces arbitrary doctrine, which prevents 
tailoring defamation principles to reflect specific institutional contexts and 
jurisdictional values.
Another way to put this is to insist upon the most robust theory−doctrine 
interface. Why do we care? What are the underlying regulatory objectives? What 
are we trying to achieve? And which of our free expression justifications is most 
relevant? Again, in the context of public libel law, at stake was not simply whether 
we obtained the right balance between freedom of expression and reputation, 
but whether we had exposed the underlying problem that the contrasting 
technicalities of public libel doctrine were obscuring. This turned out to be the 
difficulty of tailoring press regulation to a jurisdiction’s distinct accountability 
profile. In the end, the degree to which we have carefully thought about the 
theory−doctrine interface can drastically affect the nature of the regulatory 
problems being identified and solved.
5. LAW IN CONTEXT
Finally, as evidenced by the problem of public libel law, contextual factors such 
as the rise of digital surveillance and the ongoing crisis of journalism contribute 
immensely to accountability dynamics and future law reform requirements. For 
instance, several academic disciplines have reported that over the last twenty 
years, traditional models of journalism have experienced a global crisis, witnessing 
massively reduced circulation and advertising revenues, record lay-offs of 
journalists and reporters, the near elimination of investigative reporting, science 
journalism, and local news coverage, and a concomitant rise in government public 
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relations.267 Despite threatening the generation and reporting of accountability 
news and the constitutional role of the press,268 a primary implication of these 
developments is that they oblige law reform authorities to consider more liberal 
public libel doctrine than might otherwise have seemed appropriate. This broader 
perspective also ties back to the value of comparative analysis and maintaining 
a vigilant approach to the theory−doctrine interface. At last, developing a keen 
awareness for how legal problems exist in socio-political spaces not only enhances 
our understanding of their complex etiology, but also mitigates against inaccurate 
diagnoses and prescriptive reforms.
IV. CONCLUSION
As our examination of the problem of public libel law demonstrates, our ability 
to diagnose and understand contemporary problems falters when we encounter 
breakdowns in the theory−doctrine interface.269 In the case of public libel 
jurisprudence, the underlying problem involved a widespread and pervasive 
disregard of democratic accountability concerns and the checking function 
of the press. Part I demonstrates that as between Meiklejohn’s self-governance 
theory and Blasi’s checking value of the press, Britain’s Radical Whigs and 
Commonwealthmen almost exclusively emphasized and developed concerns 
resonant with the checking function rationale. As our survey of British and 
American libertarian thought exposes, somewhere between the emergence of 
British parliamentarism and contemporary defamation law reforms, we appear to 
have forgotten the importance of democratic accountability and guarding against 
new and ever-encroaching threats to political liberty that our eighteenth-century 
predecessors understood and recorded perhaps better than at any other time.
Part II supports these observations by demonstrating that Meiklejohn 
and Blasi emphasized different aspects of democratic theory that support 
fundamentally different conceptions of the press. It also shows that difficulties 
marshalling democratic theory are due (at least partially) both to incomplete 
267. See e.g. Eric CC Chang, Miriam A Golding & Seth J Hill, “Legislative Malfeasance and 
Political Accountability” (2010) 62 World Politics 177; Robert W McChesney & John 
Nichols, The Death and Life of American Journalism: The Media Revolution That Will Begin the 
World Again (Philadelphia: Nation Books, 2010); David AL Levy & Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, 
eds, The Changing Business of Journalism and Its Implications for Democracy (Oxford: Reuters 
Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2010).
268. See Alex S Jones, Losing the News: The Future of the News that Feeds Democracy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009).
269. See Beckton, supra note 111 at 584.
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articulations of freedom of expression’s core justifications, and misguided 
attempts to subsume traditional rationales under single-valued approaches. Both 
have disproportionately marginalized the checking function of the press, which 
remains the free expression value most relevant to adjudicating public libel cases 
and strengthening accountability in representative systems.
Finally, Part III reveals five lessons as we engage with the difficult but 
important task of assessing the Internet’s impact on defamation law. Besides 
endorsing advances in our jurisdictional, contextual, and institutional awareness 
of modern-day legal problems, the specific problem of public libel law reminds 
us that, even in cases most fundamental to a democratic society, where our 
defamation laws must carefully balance political criticism against personal 
character and reputation, we promote arbitrary doctrine at odds with our most 
fundamental political values. As we have seen, our strongest guarantee of sound 
defamation doctrine depends upon ensuring a complete inventory of fully 
articulated free expression justifications carefully applied to relevant issues and 
disputes. The effects of the Internet, however measured, cannot sidestep this 
basic requirement.
